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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
E. L. GEAR and FERN BATE GEAR, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ROBERT H. DA VIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 10895 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF OASE 
This is an action for fraud and deceit tried to the 
court without a jury, wherein the lower court awarded 
judgment for the plaintiffs, who are the respondents 
herein. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondents believe the judgment in their favor and 
against defendant-appellant was proper, and deny that any 
reversible error was committed by the lower court. Con-
sequently, respondents seek an affirmation of the trial 
court's judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FA01'8 
Appellant's brief raises no question as to the facts 
found by the lower court upon which the judgment is pred-
icated, and there is apparently no claim that the facts as 
found by the lower court are not fully supported by the 
evidence. The sole claim of the appeHant seems to be that 
the false and fraudulent statements made to plaintiffs by 
defendant must have been in writing in order for them to 
be asserted as an exception to discharge under Section 
17 of the Bankruptcy Act, and that the false and fraudu-
lent acts, conduct and statements of the defendant were 
simply promises made to plaintiffs to do something in the 
future and, therefore, are not actionable. 
As the facts as found by the lower court do not seem 
to be in controversy, and as an aid to the court in consid-
ering the law matter raised in appellant's brief, we believe 
it worthwhile to set out verbatim the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which the court made. These are as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That during all times material in this action, de-
fendant was the president of Mountain Motors, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, also known as Provo Studebaker Company, 
and was the manager and operator of the corporation's 
Studebaker automobile agency in Provo, Utah. 
2. That plaintiffs loaned to defendant the following 
sums of money on or about the dates indicated: 
November 24, 1961: 
July 15, 1962: 
July 22, 1963: 
$5000.00 
$5200.00 
$5000.00 
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February 22, 1964: 
April 14, 1964: 
May 20, 1964: 
July 9, 1964: 
August 11, 1964: 
Total 
$4495.25 
$5000.00 
$6500.00 
$6900.00 
$5000.00 
$43,095.25 
3. That promissory notes were made, executed and 
delivered by defendant to the plaintiffs covering each of 
said loans, and upon at least one occasion, to-wit, on or 
about May 25, 1964, defendant consolidated and renewed 
the loans which were then outstanding by the execution 
of a new promissory note in the amount of $25,000.00, and 
at that time the then outstanding notes were destroyed. 
4. That in addition to the foregoing, plaintiffs pur-
chased 100 shares capital stock of Mountain Motors, Inc., 
for the sum of $12,500.00 from the defendant herein on or 
about September 25, 1963, and paid for said stock the sum 
of $7450.00 by their check and $5050.00 by cancellaton of 
defendant's promissory note payable to plaintiffs dated July 
22, 1963, in the amount of $5000.00; that on or about Jan-
uary 9, 1964, plaintiffs purchased from defendant an addi-
tional 10 shares of capital stock of Mountain Motors, Inc. 
and paid therefor the sum of $1250.00. 
5. That Mountain Motors, Inc. ceased doing business 
shortly after the month of December, 1964, and said bus-
iness is now defunct; that in the mornth of December, 1964, 
defendant moved to the State of Colorado; that on or about 
July 16, 1965, defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt on a 
petition filed by him in the District Court of the United 
States for the District of Colorado, Denver, Colorado; that 
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the indebtedness of defendant to plaintiff referred to above 
was duly scheduled for discharge; that on or about Feb-
ruary 24, 1966, the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado made and entered an order discharg-
ing defendant from all provable claims and debts, except 
debts excepted by the Bankruptcy Act from the operation 
of a discharge in bankruptcy. 
6. That in or about the month of February, 1964, 
partially because the Studebaker Company had moved its 
automoble manufacturing business to Canada, the sales of 
automobiles by Mountain Motors, Inc. dropped from be-
tween 25 to 30 per month to about 2; that repossessions 
of previously sold automobiles by Mountain Motors, Inc., 
during February and March, 1964, increased at an unprec-
edented rate; that on or about April 10, 1964, defendant 
was informed by his aocountant and knew that the busi-
ness of Mountain Motors, Inc. was in precarious financial 
condition and that the same had lost in exces.s of $22,000.00 
in the previous 6 months, most of which loss occurred in 
the months of February and March, 1964; that defendant 
knew that he would have to look to the business of Moun-
tain Motors, Inc. to repay any funds that he might per-
sonally borrow, and he further knew that plaintiff reposed 
in him extra-ordinary trust and confidence; that notwith-
standing such information and knowledge he did not re-
veal to the plaintiffs any of the circumstances orf Moun-
tain Motors, Inc. which rendered his ability to repay prac-
tically impossible, but at all times willfully concealed the 
true condition of the business of Mountain Motors, Inc. and 
his personal inability to repay the loans, by deliberately 
misleading plaintiffs and making false and deceptive state-
ments calculated to prevent inquiry and investigation, and 
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further cakulated to create in plaintiffs the false impres-
sion that there was nothing wrong with the business ot 
Mountain Motors, Inc., and that the same was prosperous 
and profitable to the defendant. For example, after April 
10, 1964, defendant's deceptive talk, acts, and conduct were 
as follows: 
(a) On or about April 14, 1964, defendant stated to 
plaintiffs that he wanted to buy the stock of Mountain Mo-
tors, Inc. owned by Chester and Mable Oliver; that the bus-
iness of Mountain Motors was very good, and that it was in 
sound financial condition; that if he owned the stock which 
was then owned by the Olivers he would be able to save 
Mountain Motors, Inc. about $1300.00 each month since he 
was paying that much to them; that on or about May 20, 
1964, defendant, in substance and effect, repeated said 
statements, and assured plaintiffs that there was no chance 
at all of losing their money; that in reliance upon said state-
ments, all of which were false and untrue, plaintiffs loaned 
defendant $5000.00 on April 14, 1964, and the sum of 
$6500.00 on May 20, 1964. 
(b) That on or about July 9, 1964, defendant stated 
to plaintiffs that he wanted to buy the stock of Ross Fazzio 
owned by the said Ross Fazzio in Mountain Motors, Inc. 
because Ross Fazzio was demanding equality in the busi-
ness and was interferring with its operation; that defend-
ant again repeated that business was real good, all of which 
was false and untrue; that defendant further stated in sub-
stance and effect, that Mountain Motors, Inc. would pay 
a dividend on capital stock .of $750.00 in the Fall of the 
same year, which would more than compensate plaintiffs 
for their loss of dividend on Hamilton Fund stock which 
they were requested to convert to cash by the defendant 
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to loan to him, the payment of which dividend defendant 
well kne\v could not be done, and was false and untrue; 
that in reliance upon said statements plaintiffs loaned de-
fendant the sum of $6900.00 on July 9, 1964. 
(c) That on or about August 11, 1964, defendant 
stated to plaintiffs that he wanted to borrow $5000.00 in 
order to pay off the back part of the property then being 
occupied by Mountain Motors, Inc., and that he would 
then rent it back to the corporation for the sum of $750.00 
per month; that in reliance upon said statements, plaintiffs 
loaned defendant the sum of $5000.00; that in truth and 
in fact the statements were fabrications and were false 
and untrue. 
(d) That although plaintiff, E. L. Gear, was a mem-
ber of the board of directors of Mountain Motors, Inc., he 
was not notified of any director's meetings and did not 
attend any of said meetings, and defendant deceitfully, in 
order to keep plaintiffs from learning of the true facts as 
to the business of Mountain Motors, Inc., instructed the 
secretary of the corporation to omit notice to the plaintiff 
as to such meetings, but to show him as present so that 
plaintiff could collect director's fees; that specifically, dur-
ing the month of April, 1964, and thereafter, meetings of 
the board of directors were had concerning the business 
of Mountain Motors, Inc., at which plaintiff, E. L. Gear, 
was shown as present, but was not present, and was not 
notified by reason of defendant's instructions to his sub-
ordinates. 
7. That plaintiffs relied on the statements, conduct 
and actions of the defendant, and would not have loaned 
him the money as aforesaid, from and after April 10, 1964, 
.if the true facts had been known or disclosed to them. 
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8. That a reasonable attorney's fee for legal services 
rc>ndered to the plaintiffs herein is the sum of $3600.00. 
9. That defendant paid the interest on the loans 
above set forth to about December 1, 1964. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now 
ff:ak:.:s and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiffs are entitled to judgment from and 
against defendant in the sum of $23,400.00 for monies 
loaned to defendant by plaintiffs after April 10, 1964, to-
gether with interest thereon in the sum of 7% per annum 
from December 1, 1964, until the date hereof, less the sum 
of $1000.00 paid on or about October 11, 1964, amounting 
in all to the sum of $26,359.50; that plaintiffs are further 
entitled to judgment against defendant in the sum of 
~3600.00 for the use and benefit of their attorneys herein, 
and for costs expended in the amount of $40.60, totaling 
in all the sum of $30,000.10. 
2. That the false, fraudulent, deceptive and mislead-
ing statements, acts, and conduct of the defendant, and 
his willful and deliberate concealment of the true condi-
tion of the business of Mountain Motors, Inc. from and 
after April 10, 1964, constitutes fraud and the obtaining of 
money by false representations. 
3. That under the provisions of Title 11, Section 
35(a) (2) USCA, as amended, the indebtedness set forth 
above is excepted from the operation of defendant's dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 
Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS, CONDUCT, 
ACTS AND ARTIFICES OF THE DEFENDANT Af3 
FlOUND BY THE LOWER COURT CONSTITUTE OB-
TAINING MONEY OR PROPERTY BY "FALSE PR:e:;-
TENSES OR FALSE REPRESENT A TIO NS" WffifIN 
THE MEANING OF SECTION 17 (a) (2) OF TIIE 
BANKRUPTCY ACT, AND THERE IS NO REQUIRE-
MENT THAT SUCH FALSE PRETENSES OR FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS BE IN WRITING. 
Section 35 (a) (2) of Title 11, United States Code 
Annotated, is the codified Section 17 (a) (2) of the Bank-
ruptcy act. The material part of this Section reads as 
follows: 
"(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bank-
rupt from all his provable debts whether allowable in 
full or in part, except such as . . . . . . . (2) are lia-
bilities for obtaining money or property by false pre-
tenses or false representations, or for obtaining money 
or property on credit or obtaining an extension or re-
newal of credit in reliance upon a materially false state-
ment in writing respecting his financial condition made 
or published or caused to be made or published in any 
manner whatsoever with intent to deceive, . . ..... " 
(Underscoring supplied) 
It will be noted that the language of the statute set 
forth above does not require the misrepesentations con-
templated by the underscored part thereof to be in writing, 
which is the part on which respondents rely. And, no 
such requirement has apparently been imposed by any 
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3udicial construction. At page 584 in 9 Am Jur 2nd the 
edit01-s state: "The misrepresentation under the first 
part of the Bankruptcy Act 17 (a) (2), as distinguished 
from the part added in 1960, need not be in writing." See 
also the annotation in 133 ALR at page 451, making the 
same categorical statement. None of the cases cited by 
ap!Jdlant in his brief express a contrary view, and the 
writer has be€n unable to locate any text at variance to 
the foregoing. 
While it is true that some of the false and fraudulent 
statements made by the defendant to the plaintiffs were 
matters pertaining to his financial condition, these are so 
· intertwined with others not pertaining to his financial 
condition, and with his fraudulent acts, conduct and ar-
tifices which were not matters of finance, that it is im-
possible to isolate them from the general pattern of dis-
honesty and fraudulent purpose which the lower court 
found to have been the case. The cases are uniform in 
holding that it was not the intent of Congress in passing 
the Bankruptcy Act to exonerate dishonest debtors. Ham-
by v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., C.A. Va 1954, 217 F. 
2d 78; In re Oxford Inv. Co., D.C. Cal. 1965, 246 F. Supp. 
651; Koch v. Segler, Mo. App. 1960, 331 SW 2d 126, 78 
ALR 2d 1220. And the court said in the case of Beneficial 
Finance Co. vs. Norton, 1962, 185 A 2d 218, 76 NJ Super. 
577: 
"False pretenses or false representations" within sub-
section (a) (2) of this section means any conduct 
tantamount to fraud, and is not limited to false repre-
sentations as to one's financial condition." 
The cases cited by appellant are not to the contrary. 
See the Louisiana case of Sears, IWe!buck vs. Sofio, 138 So. 
10 
2d 616, htavily relied on by appellant, wherein the court 
states as follows: 
"The two circumstances referred to are unusual to say 
the least. The trial judge gave two written reason.;. 
He was convinced of defendant's honest purpose and 
that no fraud was perpetrated. The trial court heard 
and observed these witnesses and we cannot say that 
manifest error has been committed." (Underscoring 
supplied) 
POINT II 
THE STATEMENTS, ACTS, CONDUCT AND ARTI-
FICES OF APPELLANT AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL 
COURT CONSTITUTE FRAUD AND ARE NOT SIMPLY 
MATTERS OF FUTURITY OR PROMISE OF THlNGS 
TO BE DONE IN THE FUTURE. 
Where all the essential elements of fraud exist, indebt-
edness incurred as a result thereof is not discharged in 
bankruptcy. National Finance Co. of Utah v. Valdez, 11 
Utah 2d 339, 359 P.2d 9. 
In the case at bar, the lower court found all the ele-
ments oif fraud, and except for appellant's claim that some 
of the false and fraudulent matters found by the court are 
really promises of things to be done or performed in the 
future and are, therefore, not actionable, there is no claim 
that the record does not support such findings. 
To say that the statements, acts and conduct of the 
defendant are simply matters of good-faith promises to do 
something in the future is to completely ignore the record 
and the trial court's findings. Among others, the court made 
specific findings of willful and deliberate concealment, and 
misleading statements, acts, and conduct calculated to pre-
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vent inquiry and investigation. This is certainly not the 
case of the good-faith promise which appellant contends 
for. The many statements of defendant made at various 
times were patent fabrications, tailored by him to fit the 
time and circumstances and the human frailties of the 
plaintiffs in order to throw them off their guard and ex-
tract monies from them, without which he would have 
been unable to do so. This was at tile very least, "active 
concealment", which is regarded in law as positive fraud. 
"Concealment becomes a fraud where it is effected by 
misleading and deceptive talk, acts, or conduct, where 
it is accompanied by misrepresentations, or where, in 
addition to a party's silence, there is any statement, 
word, or act on his part which tends affirmatively to 
a suppression of the truth, to a covering up or disguis-
ing of the truth, or to a withdrawal or distraction of 
a party's attention from the real facts; then the line 
is overstepped and the concealment becomes a fraud. 
Such conduct is designated 'active concealment' and 
it produces the same result in law as positive misrep-
resenta ti on." 
"Very little in addition to nondisclosure of material 
facts is required to prevent the application of the gen-
eral rule which renders mere silence nonactionable, 
and to make a party guilty of fraud. For instance, 
statements ordinarily regarded as expressions of opin-
ion may be considered as sufficient where calculated 
to mislead and to prevent an examination of the prop-
erty involved, or to throw the owner off his guard in 
order to gain the property from him. Indeed, it has 
been said that the least degree of misrepresentation 
constitutes very potent evidence of fraud under such 
circumstances, and that a single word, a nod, a wink, 
a shake of the head, or a smile, intended to induce the 
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belief in the existence of a nonexisting fact, may be 
sufficient." 23 Am Jur 872. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found, in essence, that de-
fendant's indebtedness to the plaintiffs arose as a result 
of false statements and artful and deceptive words, acts, 
and conduct practiced upon plaintiffs, which, when the true 
facts were known, were more or less obviously said or done 
with intention to defraud. Such are unquestionably "false 
pretenses" or "false representations" within the meaning 
of those terms a:s used in the Bankruptcy Act, and the trial 
court's judgment should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 
By: J. Robert Bullock 
